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Abstract 
 
Much of the literature examining the effects of oil shocks asks the question ―What is an oil 
shock?‖ and has concluded that oil-price increases are asymmetric in their effects on the US 
economy.  That is, sharp increases in oil prices affect economic activity adversely, but sharp 
decreases in oil prices have no effect.  We reconsider the directional symmetry of oil-price 
shocks by addressing the question ―Where is an oil shock?‖, the answer to which reveals a great 
deal of spatial/directional asymmetry across states.  Although most states have typical responses 
to oil-price shocks—they are affected by positive shocks only—the rest experience either 
negative shocks only (5 states), both positive and negative shocks (5 states), or neither shock (5 
states). 
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1. Introduction 
 Oil-price shocks are often viewed as one of the primary exogenous causes of national 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  Hamilton (2005), for example, suggests that nine of the ten 
recessions in the United States between 1945 to 2005 were preceded by large positive increases 
in oil prices.
1
  Despite the preeminence of sharply increasing oil prices in advance of recessions, 
however, large decreases in oil prices have not tended to be followed by abnormally high 
national growth.  This fact has led to a general acceptance that oil-price shocks are directionally 
asymmetric: Large positive oil-price shocks matter, but negative ones do not.  Given the 
consensus view, studies have, for the most part, simply imposed directional asymmetry while 
focusing on the best ways to implement oil-price shocks into empirical models.
2
  Hamilton 
(2003), titled ―What is an Oil Shock?‖, is a prominent representative of these efforts.   
 Figure 1 illustrates the consensus described above and uses a Hamilton-type oil-price 
variable for which shocks occur only when the change in oil prices is larger than what had been 
experience in the recent past.
3
  All six official U.S. recessions since 1971 were preceded by 
upward spikes in oil prices, whereas real GDP growth was seemingly unaffected by the 
downward spikes of 1984-85, 1986, 1993, and 1998.   
                                                 
1
 More recently, Engemann, Kliesen, and Owyang (forthcoming) confirms this tendency for the United States and 
finds it across six additional OECD countries. 
2
 A notable exception is Kilian and Vigfusson (2010), who argue that censoring the oil price series in a VAR 
environment can produce biased impulse responses to oil shocks if the true data generating process for the shocks is 
not asymmetric.  Also, Elder and Serletis (2010) find that these results can be influenced by oil-price volatility. 
3
 This variable is described in more detail in section 2. 
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 As our title suggests, our interest is in the locations of the effects of oil-price shocks.  
Specifically, we reexamine the consensus on oil-price shocks in the context of state-level 
business cycles.  Our focus on the ―where‖ of oil-price shocks is motivated by recent studies 
finding that state-level business cycles can differ a great deal from each other and from that of 
the country as a whole.  In particular, energy-producing states and their neighbors have tended to 
experience idiosyncratic recessions following negative oil-price shocks, while often not 
experiencing the recessions seen at the national level (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2005; Crone, 
2005; and Hamilton and Owyang, forthcoming).    
 Figure 2, which compares oil-price shocks to the state recessions determined by Owyang, 
Piger, and Wall (2005) for 1979-2002, illustrates the potential variety across states in the 
relationship between oil prices and the business cycle.  The top panel shows that North  
Figure 1. National Recessions and Oil-Price Shocks 
 
NBER recessions are shaded gray; Dark gray columns are real GDP 
growth; Black line is a Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable. 
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  Figure 2. State Recessions and Oil-Price Shocks 
OPW (2005) state-level recessions are shaded gray. Black 
line is a Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable. 
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Carolina‘s experience was largely in line with that of the U.S., although North Carolina‘s 1990-
92 recession began just prior to the sharp rise in oil prices that preceded the national recession.  
The middle panel of Figure 2 shows that Texas, a prominent energy-producing state, had a 
distinctly idiosyncratic business cycle, especially with regard to the role of oil prices.  
Specifically, Texas was in recession in 1979, but did not go into recession in 1980 or the early 
1990s.  It did, however, go into recession following the negative price shock of 1986.  Finally, 
although Texas did experience a recession following the positive price shocks of 1980-81, it did 
not do so until nearly a full year after the start of the national recession.  Of the three states 
illustrated in Figure 2, New Mexico was the most unfortunate in that it tended to experience 
recessions following both positive and negative oil-price shocks.  Further, its recovery from 
recession in 1996 coincided with a sharp increase in oil prices.  As with Texas, the role of oil in 
New Mexico‘s business cycle does not fit very well with the consensus view. 
 Our statistical approach follows Hamilton (2003), although we allow for positive and 
negative oil-price shocks.  After applying the model to each state individually, we consider 
several variations on the notion of directional symmetry, all of which indicate that the usual 
result is far from the rule across states.  For example, only 21 states pass a standard test for 
directional asymmetry, which is that the sums of the coefficients on positive and negative shocks 
are not statistically the same.  After these test for the existence of positive and negative shocks, 
we look at the relative magnitudes of their effects across states and find similarly diverse results.  
For example, when we look at whether or not there is any significant response for at least one 
quarter following a shock, the states fall into four categories: Although 35 states experience only 
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positive shocks, five see only negative shocks, another five see both positive and negative 
shocks, and the remaining five see neither shock.    
 In addition to estimating the state-by-state effects of oil-price shocks, our analysis 
provides general insights into the effects of oil prices by considering 51 macroeconomic 
responses rather than one.  Further, our use of state-level data has at least one technical 
advantage over the use of national-level data alone.  Specifically, with national data there is a 
potentially serious endogeneity problem because the typical assumption is that oil-price shocks 
are exogenous and caused by events external to the U.S. economy (Barsky and Kilian, 2004; 
Killian 2008a, 2008b, and 2009).  Given the size and importance of the U.S. economy, this 
assumption is obviously problematic.  In contrast, our assumption that the world oil price is 
exogenous at the state level requires significantly less credulity.
4
   
 We should note several papers that have investigated state or regional heterogeneity in 
the responses to oil-price shocks, although none is adequate for addressing our questions: Three 
have applied VARs to a handful of states and allowed for positive oil-price shocks only (Penn, 
2006; Iledare and Olatubi, 2004; and Bhattacharya, 2003).  Others merely imputed state effects 
from industry-level results rather than looking at actual states (Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara, 
1997; Brown and Yücel, 1995), while still others have derived regional effects from measures of 
resource dependence (Brown and Hill, 1988).   
                                                 
4
 In 2008, the United States accounted for about 23 percent world oil consumption and 10 percent of world oil 
production, which are large enough shares to be concerned about endogeneity.  On the other hand, Texas accounted 
for about 2 percent of world oil production and California accounted for about 2 percent of world oil consumption. 
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 The balance of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model and 
presents national-level empirical results that serve as a benchmark.  Section 3 uses state-level 
data and considers spatial asymmetries in the responses to oil.  Section 4 summarizes and 
concludes. 
2. Empirical Implementation 
 A common approach to modeling the effect of oil-price shocks is to use a bivariate, 
single-equation model of some aggregate variable, where aggregate growth is determined by lags 
of itself and past innovations to oil prices.  Most often, the aggregate variable for the national 
economy is GDP, but, because state GDP data are not available at a suitable frequency for states, 
we use payroll employment.  Specifically, we model the growth rate in state i’s employment, 
Δyit, as an AR(4): 
  
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where 
it ~ ),0(
2
iN  , and 

 jtx  and 

 jtx  are oil-price shocks whose directions are denoted by 
their superscripts.  The preceding formulation allows us to measure potential asymmetric 
responses of state-level economic variables to oil shocks through the coefficients γij and κij.  In 
(1), jtiY  , is the weighted growth rate of employment for all states excluding state i.  The 
variable Dt-j, which takes on a value of 1 for the post-Hurricane-Katrina period accounts for the 
possibility of employment-growth outliers following the hurricane, and should be especially 
important for Louisiana and Mississippi.  Obviously, (1) represents some restrictions on the 
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cross-state relationships.  Specifically, as in Carlino and DeFina (1998 and 1999), the model 
does not allow a complete set of cross-state correlations, except through the jtiY  , , so we 
estimate a separate specification for each state. 
 In Hamilton's (1983) original paper, oil shocks are defined as the log change in oil prices 
under the implicit assumption that the effect of oil shocks on economic activity was symmetric—
i.e.,  ijij  .  This condition was relaxed in Mork (1989), who modeled potential 
asymmetries but utilized the same log change in oil prices as the baseline shock.  These 
approaches assume that small innovations in oil prices affect economic activity proportionately 
to large changes.  On the other hand, one might believe that economic agents do no change their 
behavior in the presence of small fluctuations in oil prices, so Hamilton (1996; 2003) and others 
assume that the effects of oil price shocks are not only asymmetric but nonlinear.  In Hamilton 
(1996), the best-fit model is one in which oil price shocks only have effects if the rise in prices is 
substantial—i.e., if the current (quarterly) price of oil rises above the maximum over the last 
year.
5
  Thus, we define an oil-price shock as 
)2(                                         ,
},,max{
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which assumes that only increases in oil prices affect economic activity.  Similarly, a negative 
oil-price shock is defined as 
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5
 Hamilton uses the last month of the quarter as the quarterly oil price and Hamilton (2008) uses a three-year 
window and argues that the fit is better. 
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 We estimate equation (1) first for the United States and then for each of the 50 states plus 
the District of Columbia.  Our measure of oil prices is the producer's price index for oil, although 
WTI yields similar results.  Our benchmark estimate of (1) uses the log change of seasonally-
adjusted quarterly non-farm payroll employment for the United States for 1961.1 to 2008:4.  
Note that several studies have documented a change over time in the relationship between oil and 
the macroeconomy (Blanchard and Galí, 2010; Blanchard and Riggi, 2009).  To allow for this, 
we estimate a one-time structural break in the relationship between oil and national employment 
growth using a relatively standard sup-Wald test (Andrews 1993) and find a structural break at 
1973:4.  This break coincides with the Arab oil embargo and the emergence of a OPEC as an 
active cartel. 
 Our regression results are provided in Table 1.  Note that because there were no negative 
price shocks during the pre-break period it is not possible to estimate their effect for that sub-
sample.  For the full sample and the post-break sample, it is clear that the relationship between 
employment growth and oil prices is distinctly different depending on the direction of the oil-
price shock.  For both samples, employment growth has a statistically significant negative 
response two, three, and four quarters after a positive oil-price shock, but no such response 
occurs following negative oil-price shocks.  More formally, the usual directional asymmetry, 
whereby only positive price shocks matter, is indicated for a state if   0j   but   0j .  A 
higher statistical hurdle for asymmetry is a failure to reject that   jj .  As Table 2 
shows, directional symmetry is rejected by both criteria for the full sample and the post-break 
sample.  
9 
 
Table 1. Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly U.S. Employment Growth 
Variable jty   

 jtx  

 jtx      
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
Coefficient β1 
 
β2 
 
β3 
 
β4 
 
γ1  
γ2  
γ3  
γ4  
κ1  
κ2  
κ3  
κ4  
 α 
 
              
Full Sample, 
1961:2-2008:4 
0.879 * -0.189 † 0.089  -0.092  0.001  -0.008 * -0.010 * -0.010 * 0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.210 * 
(0.076) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.038) 
 
                           
Pre-Break, 
1961:2-1973:3 
0.856 * -0.170  -0.001  -0.116  0.017  -0.061  -0.044  -0.009  
    
0.337 * 
(0.165) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
     
(0.092) 
 
                           
Post-Break, 
1973:4-2008:4 
0.892 * -0.206 † 0.112  -0.094  0.001  -0.007 † -0.009 * -0.009 * 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.180 * 
(0.090) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.044) 
 
              
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and ‗†‘. 
 
 
Table 2. Tests of Aggregate Directional Symmetry 
H0:      
0 j  
 
    
0 j   jj 
 
 
 j   
  p-value  j  p-value p-value 
Full Sample -0.028 0.000 * 0.000 0.949 
 
0.006 * 
Pre-Break -0.097 0.183 
 
 
   
Post-Break -0.025 0.000 * -0.002 0.769 
 
0.038 * 
Statistical significance at the 5 percent level is indicated by ‗*‘. 
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 Using the estimated coefficients reported in Table 1, we generate impulse responses and 
evaluate positive and negative price shocks in terms of the depth and frequency of their effects.  
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses for the post-break period and yield the typical results:  
Employment growth is reduced by a positive oil-price shock for several quarters before returning 
to normal, but a negative shock has no statistically significant effect on employment growth.  
Although we used U.S. employment rather than GDP as our measure of economic activity, our 
results are generally consistent with the existing literature on the effects of oil-price shocks. 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Employment Growth Response to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break 
(Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Spatial/Directional Asymmetry of Oil-Price Shocks 
 In this section, we demonstrate that the state-level analogue of the analysis performed 
above yields a great deal of heterogeneity in the effects of oil-price shocks.  We explore this 
spatial/directional asymmetry from two complementary perspectives: the estimated coefficients 
on the oil-price shock variables and the impulse responses to oil-price shocks.   
Positive Shock Negative Shock 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0 4 8 12 16 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0 4 8 12 16 20
11 
 
3.1. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry I: Oil-Price Shock Coefficients 
 We performed 51 independent estimations of equation (1) for the post-break period, the 
results of which are analogous to those in Table 1 for the U.S. and are provided in an appendix.  
As in the previous section for U.S. data, these estimates are summarized in Table 3 with the same 
tests for directional asymmetry that were performed using national data (Table 2).  We find 37 
states for which the sum of the coefficients on a positive price shock ( j ) is negative and 
statistically significant.  Not only are there 12 states for which  j  is statistically no different 
from zero, but for two states—North Dakota and Wyoming—it is positive and statistically 
significant.  On the other hand, there is near unanimity in the lack of statistical significance for 
 j .  The exceptions are Delaware and Wyoming, which have opposite signs on  j .  
Finally, as shown in the final column of Table 3, directional symmetry cannot be rejected for 30 
states.  Thus, the blanket observation that oil-price shocks have asymmetric effects on economic 
activity appears to be false at this level of disaggregation. 
 To get an idea of the geographic distribution of the magnitudes of the effects of oil-price 
shocks, we map the estimates for the positive-shock coefficients (Figure 4).  For the most part, 
the nonconforming states—for which the sums of these coefficients are positive or not 
statistically significant—are energy states as determined by the relative importance of energy 
production in their economies (Snead, 2009).
6
  Most of these states lie in the vast swath running 
from the western Gulf coast through Montana.  The exceptions are the non-energy states of 
Hawaii and Vermont.
                                                 
6
 As determined by Snead (2009), the 13 energy producing states are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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Table 3. The Spatial/Directional Asymmetry 
of Oil-Price Shocks, 1973:4-2008:4 
H0:      
0 j  
 
   
0 j   jj 
 
 
 j   
 p-value  j  p-value p-value 
AK 0.038 0.211 
 
0.039 0.219 
 
0.982 
 AL -0.030 0.007 * 0.010 0.391 
 
0.026* 
AR -0.046 0.000 * 0.008 0.560 
 
0.008 * 
AZ -0.053 0.000 * 0.013 0.360 
 
0.003 * 
CA -0.030 0.001 * 0.002 0.851 
 
0.028 * 
CO -0.010 0.346 
 
0.003 0.816 
 
0.453 
 CT -0.028 0.005 * 0.002 0.862 
 
0.066† 
DC -0.017 0.233 
 
-0.006 0.700 
 
0.627 
 DE -0.051 0.002 * -0.037 0.019 * 0.559
 FL -0.026 0.007 * -0.003 0.771 
 
0.128
 GA -0.053 0.000 * 0.003 0.799 
 
0.004* 
HI -0.013 0.286 
 
-0.014 0.297 
 
0.986 
 IA -0.018 0.082 † -0.014 0.196 
 
0.828
 ID -0.045 0.004 * -0.004 0.804 
 
0.115
 IL -0.022 0.014 * -0.006 0.529 
 
0.265
 IN -0.058 0.000 * -0.001 0.926 
 
0.008* 
KS -0.005 0.685 
 
0.012 0.330 
 
0.374 
 KY -0.034 0.015 * -0.010 0.487 
 
0.268
 LA 0.006 0.685 
 
0.025 0.146 
 
0.409
 MA -0.022 0.024 * 0.000 0.995 
 
0.163
 MD -0.039 0.001 * -0.006 0.597 
 
0.065† 
ME -0.029 0.022 * -0.020 0.149 
 
0.640 
 MI -0.072 0.000 * 0.003 0.849 
 
0.003* 
MN -0.021 0.026 * -0.010 0.337 
 
0.463 
 MO -0.042 0.000 * -0.003 0.778 
 
0.025* 
MS -0.047 0.000 * 0.012 0.345 
 
0.003 * 
MT -0.013 0.362 
 
0.010 0.522 
 
0.327 
 NC -0.048 0.000 * -0.010 0.427 
 
0.043* 
ND 0.023 0.053 † 0.004 0.744 
 
0.308 
 NE -0.025 0.026 * 0.016 0.177 
 
0.024* 
NH -0.023 0.100 † -0.001 0.935 
 
0.330 
 NJ -0.024 0.018 * -0.012 0.280 
 
0.446
 NM -0.013 0.194 
 
0.018 0.111 
 
0.064† 
NV -0.043 0.005 * -0.010 0.529 
 
0.179 
 NY -0.020 0.010 * -0.007 0.415 
 
0.299
 OH -0.042 0.000 * -0.008 0.466 
 
0.052† 
OK 0.018 0.226 
 
0.022 0.134 
 
0.823 
 OR -0.061 0.000 * 0.006 0.642 
 
0.001* 
PA -0.020 0.013 * -0.013 0.137 
 
0.575 
 RI -0.051 0.002 * -0.001 0.967 
 
0.046* 
SC -0.057 0.000 * -0.007 0.652 
 
0.031 * 
SD -0.010 0.379 
 
-0.004 0.782 
 
0.724 
 TN -0.054 0.000 * -0.005 0.667 
 
0.009* 
TX 0.004 0.690 
 
0.014 0.165 
 
0.442 
 UT -0.009 0.337 
 
0.015 0.143 
 
0.120
 VA -0.038 0.000 * -0.008 0.419 
 
0.056† 
VT -0.016 0.163 
 
-0.011 0.357 
 
0.783 
 WA -0.034 0.005 * 0.006 0.610 
 
0.036* 
WI -0.031 0.001 * -0.008 0.407 
 
0.133 
 WV -0.006 0.865 
 
0.018 0.609 
 
0.659
 WY 0.037 0.073 † 0.056 0.020 * 0.567
 Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and ‗†‘, respectively. 
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3.2. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry II: Impulse Responses 
 The preceding subsection looked at spatial asymmetries in oil-price shocks from the 
perspective of the shocks‘ estimated coefficients.  A different perspective can be gained from the 
state-level impulse responses, which are generated via the estimated coefficients (the βs and the 
θs) and show the effect that each type of shock.  Figure 5 provides the post-break responses to 
positive and negative oil-price shocks for five representative states: three with variants of the 
typical directional asymmetry—California, Kansas, and Michigan—and two with atypical 
responses—New Mexico and Wyoming.7 
 Unsurprisingly, given its size and diversity, the response for California is asymmetric and 
looks much like that for the United States as a whole (recall Figure 3):  A positive oil-price shock
                                                 
7
 The complete set of impulse responses can be found in the working paper version of this paper: Engemann, 
Owyang, and Wall (2012). 
Figure 4. Positive Oil-Price Shock 
Sum of State γijs 
Post-Break, 1973:4 - 2008:4
US = -0.025
-0.072 to -0.032
-0.032 to -0.018
Not Significant
0.023 to 0.037
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Figure 5. Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break, Selected States 
(Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals) 
 
Positive Price Shock Negative Price Shock 
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leads to reduced employment growth for several quarters before returning to normal, but a 
negative oil-price shock has no effect on employment growth.  Kansas has a negative but bouncy 
response to a positive oil-price shock, and its response to a negative oil-price shock is 
statistically insignificant.  Manufacturing-heavy states, such as Michigan, see a much deeper 
response to a positive oil-price shocks than does the country as a whole.  On the other hand, 
because Michigan‘s auto sector likely benefits from negative oil-price shocks, it has quarters for 
which the point estimates of its responses are positive, although not significantly so. 
 New Mexico is an example of a state with symmetric oil-price responses.  As an energy 
state, its response to a positive oil-price shock is much like that of Kansas: negative but bouncy.  
But, because it is more energy intensive than Kansas, it experiences a positive and statistically 
significant response to negative oil-price shocks.  This result is consistent with Figure 2, which 
showed how New Mexico entered recessions after both types of oil-price shocks.  Our final 
example is Wyoming, the most energy-intensive state in the country, which experiences 
asymmetric responses to oil-price shocks, but not the typical kind.  It sees a statistically 
significant and huge positive response to negative oil-price shocks only, but no statistically 
significant response to a positive oil-price shock. 
 The states are categorized in Table 4 according to their combination of responses to oil-
price shocks.  A state is said to be responsive to a shock if it sees at least one quarter when its 
response is statistically different from zero.  On this basis, 35 states see the typical directional 
asymmetry of responding only to positive oil-price shocks, whereas five energy-intensive states 
see the reverse directional asymmetry of responding only to negative oil-price shocks.  Finally, 
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10 states experience symmetric responses: five respond to both shocks and five respond to 
neither shock.  
 
Table 4. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry II, Impulse Responses 
Positive Shocks Only (36) 
Negative Shocks 
Only (5) 
Both  
Shocks (5) 
Neither Shock (5) 
AL IL MO PA LA DE AK 
AR IN MS RI ND ID CO 
AZ KS NE SC OK NC DC 
CA KY NH TN TX NM MT 
CT MA NJ UT WY VA SD 
FL MD NV VT 
  
  
GA ME NY WA 
  
  
HI MI OH WI 
  
  
IA MN OR WV 
  
  
A state experiences a shock if its response is statistically significant for at least one quarter. 
 
 Figure 6 illustrates the spatial distribution of responses to oil-price shocks, summarizing 
the responses according to their number of statistically significant quarters and the sums of the 
responses across those quarters.  The states that were least responsive to positive oil-price shocks 
tended to be energy states and their neighbors, and the size of their responses were related to 
their energy-intensity.  Even so, several northeastern states were also among the groups with the 
smallest responses.  The states most affected by positive oil-price shocks included much of the 
Far West and the two most manufacturing-intensive states, Indiana and Michigan.  Being an 
energy state was also associated with having a large positive response to a negative-oil-price 
shock: The six most energy-intensive states were so affected.  On the other hand, there are five 
non-energy states with positive responses to negative oil-price shocks, although it was for one 
quarter only in each case.  
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Figure 6. Summary of State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 Nearly all of the literature examining the effects of oil shocks has concluded that oil-price 
increases are directionally asymmetric in their effects on the U.S. economy.  That is, sharp 
increases in oil prices affect economic activity adversely, but sharp decreases in oil prices have 
no effect.  We consider several variations on the notion of price-shock symmetry, all of which 
indicate that the usual asymmetry assumption is far from the rule across states.  For example, 
Positive Price Shock Negative Price Shock 
Number of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 6
0 
1 or 2
3 or 4
5 or 6
7 
Number of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 0
0
1
2
3
Sum of Significant Quarters
U.S. = -0.56
-1.20 to -0.90
-0.90 to -0.70
-0.70 to -0.42
-0.42 to -0.05
0
Sum of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 0
0
0.07 to 0.17
0.19 to 0.39
0.90
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only 21 states pass a standard test for directional asymmetry, which is that the sums of the 
coefficients on positive and negative shocks are not statistically the same.  A similar picture 
emerges from an analysis of state-level impulse responses to oil-price shocks.  Although most 
states have typical responses to oil-price shocks—they experience positive shocks only—the rest 
experience either negative shocks only (5 states), both positive and negative shocks (5 states), or 
neither shock (5).  The magnitudes of the effects shocks also differ a great deal across states.  
The most energy-intensive states respond only to negative oil-price shocks and the states that 
respond to both shocks are is a mixed bag, including several non-energy states.  
 Discussions about the U.S. macroeconomy tend to include little, if any, appreciation of 
the extent to which conditions differ across cities, states, or regions.  Recent research, however, 
has documented significant business-cycle differences across various geographic units.  This 
paper goes a step further to show how oil-price shocks, which have tended to precede national 
recessions, can have opposite effects across states.  This fact has several implications for policy 
makers.  For one, true measures of the state of the economy can be masked by the fact that 
several states might be doing well following a positive price shock.  Also, state and national 
governments can play different roles in responding to oil-price shocks: Nationally focused 
policies are more appropriate following positive oil-price shocks, whereas state-focused policies 
are more appropriate following negative shocks.    
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Appendix. Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
AK 0.365 * 0.114  0.441 * -0.252 * -0.254  0.528  -0.859 † 0.687 † 0.023  0.003  0.012  0.001  0.036 * 0.001  0.003  -0.002  0.149  
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.083
) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.368) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.359) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.213) 
 
                  AL 0.045  0.119  0.157  0.198 † 1.270 * -1.112 * 0.126  -0.212  0.004  -0.008  -0.008  -0.018 * 0.004  0.005  0.003  -0.002  0.246 * 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.122
) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.070) 
 
                  AR 0.557 * -0.106  -0.002  0.069  0.466 † -0.565 † 0.158  -0.065  -0.011  -0.002  -0.007  -0.026 * 0.006  -0.004  0.007  -0.001  0.359 * 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.152
) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.301) 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.080) 
 
                  AZ 0.324 * 0.372 * 0.129  0.026  0.891 * -1.348 * 0.463 † -0.222  0.011  -0.018 * -0.033 * -0.014  0.004  -0.001  0.011  -0.001  0.353 * 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.107
) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.250) 
 
(0.274) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.094) 
 
                  CA 0.556 * 0.123  0.049  0.137  0.365 * -0.363 * -0.007  -0.044  0.005  -0.013 * -0.009  -0.012 * 0.004  -0.007  0.002  0.003  0.149 * 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.123
) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.056) 
 
                  CO 0.517 * 0.163  0.142  -0.062  0.456 * -0.443 * 0.168  -0.190  0.006  -0.007  -0.004  -0.004  0.006  0.005  0.002  -0.009  0.183 * 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.118
) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.072) 
 
                  CT 0.086  0.413 * 0.212 * 0.040  0.758 * -0.572 * -0.002  -0.154  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.022 * -0.004  -0.002  0.001  0.007  0.108  
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105
) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.202) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.068) 
 
                  DC 0.072  0.184 * 0.153  0.184 † 0.233  -0.159  -0.029  0.068  0.001  -0.005  -0.003  -0.009  0.010  -0.004  0.001  -0.013  0.053  
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091
) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.089) 
 
                  DE -0.139  0.280 * 0.122  -0.109  0.786 * -0.579 * 0.320  -0.259  -0.014  0.004  -0.017 † -0.024 * 0.000  -0.014  -0.007  -0.016 * 0.341 * 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.097
) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.279) 
 
(0.277) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.098) 
 
                  FL 0.735 * -0.045  0.443 * -0.282 * 0.233  -0.126  -0.371 * 0.097  0.003  -0.010 † -0.010  -0.009  0.006  -0.009  0.005  -0.005  0.233 * 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.116
) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.064) 
 
                  GA 0.444 * 0.141  0.068  -0.091  0.476 * -0.533 † 0.019  0.111  -0.008  -0.013 † -0.010  -0.021 * 0.005  -0.005  0.002  0.001  0.367 * 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.138
) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.205) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.080) 
 
                  HI 0.182 † 0.286 * 0.360 * -0.138  0.506 * -0.538 * 0.238  -0.059  0.005  -0.001  -0.014 † -0.003  0.006  -0.018 * 0.002  -0.004  0.082  
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.086
) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.083) 
 
                  IA 0.123  0.169  0.534 * -0.052  0.980 * -0.642 * -0.583 * 0.135  0.005  0.003  -0.011 † -0.014 * 0.002  -0.006  -0.002  -0.009  0.144 * 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.118
) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.063) 
 
                  ID 0.437 * 0.055  0.436 * -0.168  0.469 † -0.835 * 0.058  0.106  0.009  -0.014  -0.023 * -0.017 † 0.000  -0.002  -0.006  0.004  0.341 * 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.127
) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.346) 
 
(0.336) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.106) 
 
                  IL 0.047  0.167  0.202 * -0.259 * 0.926 * -0.096  -0.426 * 0.217  -0.006  0.001  0.003  -0.020 * 0.001  -0.008  -0.004  0.005  -0.038  
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.101
) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.061) 
 
                  IN 0.055  0.164  0.121  0.002  1.231 * -0.845 * -0.033  -0.178  -0.010  -0.020 * -0.009  -0.019 * 0.004  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  0.273 * 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.140
) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.320) 
 
(0.325) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.084) 
 
                  KS 0.102  0.209 † 0.204 † -0.073  0.809 * -0.409 † -0.304  0.179  0.008  -0.011  0.002  -0.003  0.002  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.148 † 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.112
) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.075) 
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Appendix (continued). Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
KY -0.136  0.286 * 0.004  0.159  1.394 * -1.002 * 0.259  -0.261  -0.007  -0.018 * 0.007  -0.015 † 0.006  -0.011  0.005  -0.011  0.207 * 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.297) 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.086) 
 
                  LA 0.284 * 0.108  0.247 * -0.018  0.609 * -0.320  -0.126  -0.010  0.007  0.000  0.009  -0.009  0.022 * 0.009  -0.002  -0.004  0.077  
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.093) 
 
                  MA 0.304 * 0.362 * 0.423 * -0.256 * 0.933 * -1.047 * -0.115  0.093  0.006  -0.010 † -0.005  -0.013 * 0.005  -0.002  0.002  -0.005  0.150 * 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.065) 
 
                  MD 0.007  0.259 * 0.197 † 0.083  0.611 * -0.202  -0.392 † 0.163  -0.007  -0.014 * -0.010  -0.007  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.204 * 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.069) 
 
                  ME 0.264 * 0.065  0.101  0.126  0.914 * -0.964 * 0.306  -0.216  0.000  -0.003  -0.018 * -0.008  -0.007  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006  0.203 * 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  MI 0.236 † 0.030  0.411 * -0.207  0.939 * -0.818 * -0.309  0.289  -0.008  -0.023 * -0.017 † -0.023 * 0.006  0.001  -0.005  0.002  0.251 * 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.275) 
 
(0.331) 
 
(0.314) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.107) 
 
                  MN 0.110  0.277 * 0.178  0.038  0.846 * -0.551 * 0.041  -0.162  -0.004  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.003  -0.004  0.003  -0.006  0.154 * 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.059) 
 
                  MO 0.017  0.038  0.074  -0.191  0.969 * -0.411 † -0.065  0.230  -0.007  -0.025 * 0.000  -0.010  0.000  -0.009  0.005  0.000  0.159 * 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.067) 
 
                  MS 0.517 * 0.133  0.022  -0.070  0.515 * -0.759 * -0.004  0.255  0.004  -0.012  -0.026 * -0.014  0.013 † -0.008  0.001  0.006  0.265 * 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  MT 0.155 † 0.097  0.184 † 0.142  0.885 * -0.647 * -0.342  0.101  0.004  -0.009  -0.012  0.004  0.014  -0.008  -0.001  0.006  0.247 * 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.102) 
 
                  NC 0.432 * 0.151  -0.328 * -0.054  0.574 * -0.668 * 0.657 * -0.116  -0.002  -0.012 † -0.024 * -0.011  -0.001  -0.004  0.001  -0.006  0.335 * 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.234) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.077) 
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Appendix (continued). Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
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(0.193) 
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(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
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                  WV -0.395 * -0.072  -0.180 † -0.060  1.740 * -1.184 † 0.799  0.114  -0.034 † 0.012  0.024  -0.008  0.002  0.002  0.010  0.005  -0.201  
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(0.466) 
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(0.672) 
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(0.020) 
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(0.218) 
 
                  WY 0.432 * 0.033  0.275 * -0.123  0.668 * -0.003  -0.227  0.001  0.011  0.000  0.031 * -0.005  0.040 * 0.014  0.015  -0.014  0.015  
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.341) 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.124) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and ‗†‘, respectively. 
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Appendix: State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break  
For each state, the top figure is the response to a positive price shock 
 and the bottom is the response to a negative price shock 
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Appendix (continued): State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break  
For each state, the top figure is the response to a positive price shock 
 and the bottom is the response to a negative price shock 
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Appendix (continued): State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break  
For each state, the top figure is the response to a positive price shock 
 and the bottom is the response to a negative price shock 
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Appendix (continued): State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break  
For each state, the top figure is the response to a positive price shock 
 and the bottom is the response to a negative price shock 
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Appendix (continued): State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break  
For each state, the top figure is the response to a positive price shock 
 and the bottom is the response to a negative price shock 
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